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Abstract 
Since its inception more than forty years ago, social representations theory has been subjected 
to several criticisms, particularly within British discursive psychology. This paper reviews 
four major controversies that lie in the areas of a) theoretical ambiguities, b) social 
determinism, c) cognitive reductionism and d) lack of a critical agenda. A detailed discussion 
and evaluation of these criticisms reveals that while some can be regarded as 
misinterpretations, others need to be treated as serious and constructive suggestions for 
extending and refining the current theoretical framework. The main argument underlying this 
review is that many of the criticisms are based on the difficulty to understand and integrate 
the complex, dynamic and dialectical relationship between individual agency and social 
structure that forms the core of social representations theory. Engaging with the critics is thus 
thought to provide clarification and to initiate critical dialogue, which is seen as crucial for 
theoretical development. 
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Social representations theory, originally developed by Serge Moscovici (1961), is 
certainly one of the more controversial concepts in contemporary social psychology. Despite 
its continuing attraction to many researchers and theorists around the world, it has received 
extensive criticism, particularly within the British context. While these critiques demonstrate 
that the theory of social representations is taken seriously enough to debate (Billig, 1987), we 
consider a thorough discussion of these objections essential for the conceptual development 
of the theory. It will be shown that whereas some of the criticisms can be regarded as 
misunderstandings, others need to be treated as serious and constructive points for improving 
or extending the current theoretical framework. Furthermore, engaging with these criticisms 
may promote a more critical version of social representations theory that invites a social 
psychology of conflict, resistance and social change relevant to today’s world. 
On the whole, most critics recognise the importance of social representations theory 
within social psychology and are sympathetic to its aims and general propositions. In 
particular, many regard it as a necessary challenge to dominant US-American social 
psychology which they characterise as individualistic, behaviourist and experimentally driven 
(e.g. Jahoda, 1988; Parker, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1998). However, it is both in the details 
of its conceptual elaboration as in its practical application that critics find weaknesses. Since 
problems in the theoretical formulation of social representations are seen as responsible for 
alleged difficulties in its application (Potter & Litton, 1985; Litton & Potter, 1985), it is these 
theoretical controversies that we will focus on. We point to four central issues that need to be 
clarified or developed: a) ambiguities in defining social representations, b) social 
determinism, c) cognitive reductionism and d) the apparent lack of a critical agenda. 
What we argue in this paper is that many of the criticisms relate to the complex and 
dynamic relationship between social structure and individual agency put forth in the theory. It 
is this dialectical concept of social life and social cognition that is so much in contrast to the 
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Cartesian dualism still haunting social psychology today (Marková, 1982; Farr, 1996). This 
makes social representations theory difficult to integrate into both US-American and British 
social psychology. In many social psychological theories, the relationship between the 
psychological and the social is depicted as a separation of individual perception and 
cognition on the one hand and culture and social context on the other. The unusual position of 
social representations as simultaneously between individuals and the societies they live in 
(Howarth, 2001) has led to the contradictory criticisms of social determinism and cognitive 
reductionism. These conflicting critiques call for a detailed review of the theory and its 
propositions, going back to Moscovici’s seminal work La psychanalyse: Son image et son 
public from 1961. This is where we start. 
A brief introduction to the theory of social representations 
Moscovici developed the theory of social representations from his study of the 
diffusion of the scientific concept of psychoanalysis among the French public in the 1960s. In 
the preface of the accompanying book Lagache (1976) asserts that Moscovici’s ideas should 
stimulate and invite social psychological dialogue. Clearly this purpose has been achieved 
given the critical discussions and defensive replies the theory has since provoked. In this 
research, Moscovici used a combination of questionnaires, interviews and content analysis of 
the French press and complex sampling procedures with different subgroups of French 
society in order to capture a comprehensive overview of diverse bodies of opinion. He did not 
attempt to construct a unified picture but to hold central the heterogeneity and tension he 
found in the data. 
Moscovici takes Durkheim’s (1898) notion of collective representations as the starting point 
for his theoretical development. For Durkheim (1898), collective representations are a very 
general category that includes broad elements such as science, ideology, worldview and myth. 
However, he does not distinguish between these different forms of organised thought, which 
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is why, for Moscovici (1961), the concept of representation loses its distinction and clarity. 
Moreover, the concept of collective representation does not reflect the mobile and 
heterogeneous nature of contemporary societies (Howarth, 2001). As Jovchelovitch (2001) 
outlines, the Durkheimian notion refers to a form of knowledge that is produced by a single 
source of authority, that is strongly resistant to change and that functions to bind societies 
together. Yet, Moscovici (1988) makes clear that: 
It seems to be an aberration, in any case, to consider representations as 
homogeneous and shared as such by a whole society. What we wished to 
emphasize by giving up the word collective was this plurality of representations 
and their diversity within a group. (p. 219) 
Moscovici (1961) is interested in the relationship between the socio-cultural inter-
subjectivity and the psychological organisation of knowledge and so emphasises that we need 
to move towards an active understanding of representations. A representation is not a mere 
reflection or reproduction of some external reality. There is symbolic space in the 
development and negotiation of representations, which is why all human beings hold creative 
power and agency in their formation and use. By transforming the Durkheimian notion into 
the concept of social representations, Moscovici deliberately allows for the co-existence of 
competing and sometimes contradictory versions of reality in one and the same community, 
culture and individual (Howarth, Foster & Dorrer, 2004). 
This emphasis on the plural or hybrid nature of social knowledge is also found in the 
concept of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961) that currently receives renewed interest 
from social representations theorists (e.g. Jovchelovitch, 2002; Wagner, Duveen, Verma & 
Themel, 2000). This concept implies that different and incompatible cognitive styles and 
forms of knowledge can co-exist within one social group and can be employed by one and the 
same individual. Depending on the tasks and social settings prevalent at a particular time, 
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human beings can draw on conflicting representations. “Cognitive polyphasia thus refers to a 
state in which different kinds of knowledge, possessing different rationalities, live side by 
side in the same individual or collective” (Jovchelovitch, 2002, p. 124). In this way, so-called 
traditional and modern representations, which appear contradictory may actually confront 
rather than replace each other (cf. Wagner et al., 2000). 
The concept of cognitive polyphasia already indicates that the nature of a social 
representation closely relates to its social and psychological functions. But what is the main 
function of representation? To put it simply, social representations are “ways of world 
making” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 231). A more detailed definition that is commonly referred to 
describes social representations as: 
A system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish 
an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material 
and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take 
place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for 
social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the 
various aspects of their world and their individual and group history. (Moscovici, 
1973, p. xiii) 
This definition highlights that social representations help us to make sense of our world 
and to interact within it with other societal members. They have the main function of 
familiarising the unfamiliar since it is the unknown or incomprehensible that may constitute a 
threat to our socially constructed realities (Moscovici, 1984a). In other words, social 
representations are triggered by the realisation of a gap between what one knows and what 
one does not understand or cannot explain (Moscovici, 1961).
1
 Every representation can 
thereby be understood of being situated inside a dynamic semiotic triangle, as proposed by 
Moscovici (1984b). This triadic relation specifies the three important dimensions of social 
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psychology generally and of every representation in particular: the object that is represented, 
the subject that undertakes the representation and the social group whom the subject is 
positioning him- or herself towards in undertaking this representation. The subject-object 
opposition is not enough to fully understand the fundamentally social nature of representation. 
We need to be in relationship with others to give meaning to the object and to be able to 
develop an inter-subjective reality that serves as a common code for communication and 
social interaction (Jovchelovitch, 2002). 
The creation of such an inter-subjective reality through social representation implies 
both human agency and social influence. On the one hand, social representations are created 
by human beings in order to conventionalise objects, persons and events by placing them in a 
familiar social context (Moscovici, 1984a). On the other hand, once established, these 
representations influence human behaviour and social interaction by often subtly imposing 
themselves upon us and so limiting our socio-cognitive activities. Social representations are 
therefore not only a product of human agents acting upon their society but are equally 
prescriptive and coercive in nature. They become part of the collective consciousness, 
especially once they are “fossilised” in tradition and taken for granted in social practice 
(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 13). 
Yet, this does not mean that social representations cannot be challenged or changed. In 
the same way that they are created by human beings they can be modified by them. 
Jovchelovitch (1996) highlights that since they act as reference points in every social 
encounter, “social representations are inseparable from the dynamics of everyday life, where 
the mobile interactions of the present can potentially challenge the taken-for-granted, 
imposing pockets of novelty on traditions coming from the past’ (1996, p. 124). It is these 
dialectics between agency and structure, tradition and change that have led to different 
criticisms of social representations theory. Let us now turn to these. 
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CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
A) THEORETICAL AMBIGUITIES? 
Certainly the most frequent criticism of the theory of social representations is that it is 
too broad and too vague. Moscovici’s writings have been severely criticised as being 
“fragmented and sometimes contradictory” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 139), as 
demonstrating a “polemical style of argument by anecdote” (McGuire, 1986, p. 103) or as “a 
pot-pourri of contradictory ideas, seasoned with some pieces of speculative cognitive 
psychology” (McKinlay & Potter, 1987, p. 484). Potter and Litton (1985) do not even give it 
the status of a theory but rather refer to social representations as “a concept in search of 
theory” (p. 82). More recently, Valsiner (1998) has reiterated this point in stating that their 
“actual theoretical elaboration has yet to take place” (p. 149). Without greater conceptual 
precision, critics warn, the concept of social representations is doomed to become a 
“background concept” (Billig, 1988, p. 8), a “catch-all term” (Litton & Potter, 1985, p. 385) 
or “a kind of pseudo-explanation” (Jahoda, 1988, p. 206). 
Despite claims to the contrary (Potter & Litton, 1985), definitions of social 
representations are available in the literature. For instance, Billig (1988) highlights that as 
early as 1963 Moscovici states that “social representation is defined as the elaborating of a 
social object by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicating” (Moscovici, 
1963, p. 251). Another often cited definition has been given in the brief introduction above. 
However, Moscovici is keen not to apply a definition that is too restrictive as complex social 
phenomena cannot be reduced to simple propositions (in discussion with Marková, 2001). 
Rather than using a hypothetico-deductive model that formulates clear guidelines for testing 
and operationalising a theory, he follows a more inductive and descriptive approach in the 
study of social representations. 
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Another reason why it makes more sense to characterise rather than define social 
representations is their inherent dynamics. Given their position inside the triadic asymmetry 
of self, other and object, social representations can be very volatile and will transform over 
time. “Thus, attempts to provide an exhaustive definition of such phenomena are based on a 
misconception of their nature” (Marková, 2000, p. 430). Such misconceptions could stem, in 
part at least from language differences and translation. 
In its early years, the theory was predominately elaborated in French starting with the 
work of its founding father Moscovici (1961) followed by studies by Herzlich (1969) and 
Jodelet (1989). Moscovici’s original work, which lays down the basic concepts and 
theoretical foundation of social representations, is still not available in English and so 
remains largely inaccessible to Anglo-Saxon social psychologists. Räty and Snellman (1992) 
explain that this has resulted in the theory not entering Anglo-Saxon literature before the 
early 1980s &ndash; twenty years after its inception. Marková (in discussion with Moscovici, 
2001) particularly regrets the lack of an English translation of the second and lesser known 
part of La psychanalyse which explores the relationship between social representations, 
language and communication. Also more recent work within the area of social 
representations has remained in French, German or Spanish (e.g. Aebischer, Deconchy & 
Lipiansky, 1991; Banchs, 1996; Flick, 1991; Wagner, 1994), adding to the language barrier 
for many English speaking academics. Moreover, every translation into English inevitably 
involves a loss or change in meaning, due to the connection between language and culture. 
For example, one possible reason for misunderstandings in the Anglo-Saxon world lies in a 
different understanding of the word ‘representation’. Representation in English is 
approximate to ‘reflection’ or ‘reproduction’, whereas in French the word carries a more 
active and purposeful component (Wagner, 1998).
2
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Linguistic differences may explain some of the contentions; however we still need to 
address the specific criticisms of over-generalisation and contradiction. Jahoda (1988), for 
example, criticises the overlap between the concept of social representation and other 
categories such as common sense, ideology or culture. Eiser (1986) goes further in accusing 
Moscovici of caricaturing other cognitive theories in order to preserve the distinctiveness of 
his own theory, thus implying that the theory has little substance or originality. Billig (1988) 
highlights a specific inconsistency in the use of social representations, in terms of being 
described as both a universal and a particular concept. While a universal sense derives from 
treating social representations as a concept that exists in every society, a particular sense is 
evident in seeing social representations as peculiar to modern societies. 
It is very true that the broader a concept becomes the less it can help us to focus on very 
specific phenomena. In the context of social representations theory, this means that in order 
to reduce its vagueness and overlap with similar concepts we need to clarify what is 
distinctive about social representations. This is precisely what Moscovici (1961) does in his 
seminal work: he develops the notion of social representation by comparing and contrasting it 
to existing sociological and psychological concepts. He discusses how the notions of 
ideology, science and worldview are too general and global to account for the socio-cultural 
specificity of a representation as a form of knowledge particular to a certain group. This 
discussion helps resolve the seemingly inconsistent use of social representations Billig (1988) 
has noted. Our reading of Moscovici points towards a universal understanding of social 
representations as indispensable features of social life in all cultures. There is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that both traditional and contemporary societies have the capacity to re-
present different forms of social knowledge (de-Graft Aikins, 2003). The point is, of course, 
that conditions of late modernity profoundly impact on the pace at which social 
representations develop, merge and oscillate. Moscovici never argued that social 
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representations could not exist in traditional societies, but that in late modern times they take 
on a more diverse and fragmented form. This is due to the emergence of multiple sources of 
power, authority and knowledge (Foucault, 1980). What has changed today is the structure of 
society and thus the lifespan, diversity and fragmentation of social representations, not their 
existence, creation or influence on social interactions.
3
 Thus, the social world has a 
fundamental impact on not only what we think but, crucially, how we think. 
Another reason for Moscovici’s (1961) rejection of the sociological notions of 
ideology, science or worldview is that they cannot capture the psychological organisation of 
that socially produced knowledge. He wants to move beyond a sociological understanding of 
social representations “as explanatory devices irreducible by any further analysis” (Moscovici, 
1984a, p. 15). However, turning to existing psychological notions is equally problematic. 
Moscovici (1961) points out that within psychology as a whole the term representation is 
mostly equated with the internal seemingly ‘biased’ reflection of an external reality. For 
Moscovici an object is not simply reproduced in the mind of an individual but given life 
through the socio-cognitive activity of its user that embeds it in a cultural and historical 
context. It is not a cognitive process or a social process: it is simultaneously both. 
Looking at the field of social psychology, Moscovici (1961) finds that existing 
notions do not achieve such an integration of the sociological and the psychological. He 
concludes that it is necessary to develop a concept that is distinct from notions such as 
opinion, attitude or stereotype, which he describes as short-term responses towards objects 
independent of the social actors and their intentions. Hence the aim of developing a distinct 
social psychological concept marks the beginning of social representation and, indeed, has 
been followed by social representations theorists in their elaboration of its relation to other 
concepts such as social identity (Breakwell, 1993; Duveen, 2001; Howarth, 2002a), 
attributions (Hewstone, 1983; Hewstone & Augoustinos, 1998) or attitudes (Gaskell, 2001; 
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Jaspars & Fraser, 1984).
4
 Clearly the theoretical ambiguities discussed here do not seem to 
have caused a rejection of social representations within the discipline but rather provoked 
interest in refining and developing it, as its rich history of more than forty years of 
stimulating research and debate demonstrates. 
b) Social determinism? 
A more specific criticism of social representations theory relates to an alleged 
overemphasis of social influence (e.g. Parker, 1987) that is said to neglect the human capacity 
of reflexivity (e.g. Jahoda, 1988). Jahoda asserts that people are not described as active agents 
but as passive entities unable to break free from the existing framework of social 
representations. As such he claims that the theory indicates a revival of the notion of ‘group 
mind’ whereby the ideas of an elite dominate lay thinking. It is this prescriptive influence on 
human activity which Moscovici stresses in saying that social representations “impose 
themselves upon us with an irresistible force” (1984a, p. 9) that McKinlay and Potter (1987) 
find equally unjustified. They argue that as representations are guided by history and tradition, 
there is not adequate room for social change within the theory of social representations: 
The reality of yesterday controls the reality of today, says Moscovici, such 
that intellectual activity constitutes a mere rehearsal or representation of 
what has already gone before, in that our minds are conditioned by 
representations which are forced upon us. (McKinlay & Potter, 1987, p. 475) 
The demand for more consideration of change and dynamics has recently been taken 
up by Hermans (2003). He questions how far social representations theory is able to capture 
individual responses to the common stock of knowledge and the dynamic multiplicity of 
independently organising self-positions. 
The argument that social representations theory paints an overly deterministic picture 
of human relations is closely linked to the criticism of the notion of consensus. It is claimed 
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that the theory presents social representation as a process where every mind is infiltrated with 
the same images and explanations and thus individuals come to develop a consensual view of 
reality. This depiction is unsurprisingly criticised for being an unrealistic version of 
psychology (Parker, 1987; Potter & Litton, 1985). Billig’s (1988, 1993) objection relates to 
the marginalisation of the psychological and social importance of argumentation. His main 
point is that an (over) emphasis on the common character of cognition runs the risk of 
dismissing the dialogic or conflicting character of our psychology. To put it simply, without 
contradiction and conflict there is no ‘food for thought’ since there is nothing to argue about 
both with others and with oneself. For Billig (1987), thought is necessarily dialectic and 
involves dilemmas and dispute to remain alive. 
What is problematic about these criticisms is that they reduce social representations 
theory to one of its major elements, which is the influence of society on the individual 
&ndash; the impact of culture on cognition. However, as a consequence of its dialectical 
epistemology, one element of the theory cannot make sense without its interrelated 
counterpart. Culture and cognition exist in a symbiotic relationship to one another. A 
representation is not simply a repetition or replication of some idea presented by a dominant 
social group; it involves the deliberate action of those involved. This is something described 
in depth in discussions on the interrelation between social representations and social identity. 
In their examination of representations of gender in young children, Duveen and Lloyd (1990) 
for example, specifically describe how human beings evolve in relation to a net of already 
established social representations. Duveen (2001) explains that these representations underlie 
the child’s interactions with parents, teachers and the community. Once confronted with the 
representations that circulate in the community in which the child grows up, however, he or 
she does not simply absorb and internalise them as they are, but “comes to re-interpret, to re-
construct, and so to re-present” them to him- or herself (Howarth, 2002a, p. 156). Thus, in the 
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process of ‘taking on’ social representations, there is always the possibility of re-negotiation 
and so transformation and change. 
Voelklein (2003) emphasises that it is exactly through the contact with conflicting 
social representations that human beings begin to reflect on their own views and realise what 
is distinctive about the representations they hold. It is through such dialogue and conflict that 
existing representations are revisited and adjusted. Hence, the theory cannot be seen as overly 
deterministic, but rather, as Marková (2000) has argued, “conceives of the dynamics of 
thought, language and social practices as interdependent socio-cultural and individual 
phenomena which are co-constructed by means of tension and polarization of antinomies” (p. 
419). Such a dialogic understanding of social representations also helps us to address the 
criticism of consensus. Rose, Efraim, Gervais, Joffe, Jovchelovitch and Morant (1995) make 
clear that the idea of consensus as agreement at the level of specific conversations would 
contradict social representations theory by rendering the concept of social representation 
entirely static and by making communication de facto obsolete. While there must be a certain 
degree of consensus based upon a common language, tradition and rituals for cognition, 
recognition and communication to take place, there is also the argumentative level of 
immediate social interaction that is characterised by fragmentation, contradiction and thus 
social change. 
One possible explanation for this misinterpretation is the equation of the adjective 
‘social’ in social representations with their consensually shared nature. However, the social 
nature of these representations is based upon a number of points outlined by Moscovici (1961). 
Firstly, representations make up the common culture and so construct the symbolic boundaries 
and thereby identities of social groups and communities (cf. Howarth, 2002a). Secondly, 
representations are social in the sense that are always collectively created and validated 
through processes of communication and social interaction and thus cannot to seen to belong to 
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one individual alone (cf. Rose et al., 1995). Thirdly, representations are social since their 
content and specific form is influenced by the historic or economic climate as well as the social 
practices and general cultural context (cf. Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 1999). A certain degree of 
consensus then is not the sole defining feature of social representations but rather the product 
of the collaborative creation, negotiation and use of social representations. 
Indeed, Moscovici (1985) has made clear that he holds a dynamic and holistic 
understanding of consensus that is not synonymous with uniformity. Echoing Billig’s (1987) 
rhetorical approach to social psychology, he argues that social representations always 
presuppose a mixture of diversity and agreement. However, what we can concede is that 
conflict and argumentation are still under-theorised within social representation theory, as 
argued by Potter and Billig (1992). It is therefore time to address social representation as 
dispute and ideological conflict (Howarth, 2005), as without such development, the theory 
could be seen weak in terms of its power in social critique. 
c) Cognitive reductionism? 
A third major criticism maintains that the theory characterises representation as a 
overly cognitive phenomenon that can chiefly be explained by psychological processes with 
scant reference to social influence (Jahoda, 1988; Parker, 1987; Semin, 1985). McGuire 
(1986), for example, describes social representation as a process of abstracting small units of 
information received and assimilating them into pre-existing cognitive (rather than socially 
constructed) categories. He claims that while social representations introduce “serious errors” 
in cognition through the oversimplification they produce, they are nonetheless “cost 
effective” (McGuire, 1986, p. 102) since they enable coping with an otherwise unmanageable 
complexity due to the (assumed) limited nature of human information-processing. 
For Semin (1985), the problem lies in introducing psychological processes into a 
theory of social knowledge and societal change. According to him, the main problem derives 
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from the conflict between Moscovici’s aim to shift the level of social psychological analysis 
from the individual to the collective while proposing anchoring and objectifying as the two 
key psychological processes which, for Semin, can be readily subsumed under cognitive 
psychology and again used as an information-processing metaphor. Billig (1993) explains 
that the reason for this (mis) understanding is that the processes of anchoring and 
objectification are similar to cognitive psychologists’ descriptions of categorisation and 
schemata. The real mistake is depicting anchoring and objectifying as purely cognitive 
processes, or even assuming that there can be ‘purely cognitive’ processes. Rigorous social 
representations research has highlighted that anchoring and objectification are indeed social, 
cultural and ideological as much as cognitive (e.g. Jodelet, 1991; Voelklein, 2004; Wagner, 
Elejabarrieta & Lahnsteiner, 1995). 
Rather constructively, Billig (1988, 1993) warns social representations theorists not to 
become trapped in the one-sidedness of cognitive psychology, which has neglected 
particularisation by exclusively focussing on categorisation. The same could happen to social 
representations theory, he argues, if the theorisation of anchoring does not take into account 
the human abilities to negate and particularise. Moreover, he remarks, anchoring is not an 
automatic process but might lead to arguments and debate in groups. More critically, Potter 
and Billig (1992) assert that the processes of anchoring and objectification channel social 
representations theory into cognitive reductionism and subsume it under the 
“decontextualised, desocialised and uncultured universe of laboratory experiments” (p. 16). 
Instead of concentrating on thoughts and beliefs, they argue, social psychology should focus 
on the pragmatics of discourse and how social representations are achieved through talk in 
practice. More recently, Potter and Edwards (1999) have related this criticism to an 
opposition between cognition and action. They claim that while discourse theories are 
oriented towards accomplishing particular tasks in relation to others, social representation 
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remains on a perceptual-cognitive and therefore individual level. Similarly, Potter (1996) 
states that “social representations are ways of understanding the world which influence action, 
but are not themselves parts of action” (p. 168). 
To remedy this alleged overemphasis on cognition, Potter and Litton (1985) would 
like to re-establish social representations as linguistic repertoires, which they define as 
“recurrently used systems of terms for characterizing actions, events and other phenomena” 
consisting of “a limited range of lexical items and particular stylistic and grammatical 
constructions, combined with specific metaphors and tropes” (p. 89). They suggest that this 
reinterpretation would emphasise that representations are linguistically constituted and 
constructed in specific contexts, and it would have the advantage of not assuming any direct 
link to identity and social categories. 
Despite these criticisms, social representations theorists would be wrong to hastily 
reject the cognitive dimension of social representations. On the contrary, as one of the central 
aims of social representations theory, it is important to reconstitute the essentially socio-
historical nature of cognition. This would release the term ‘cognitive’ from its rather 
unhelpfully negative connotations. Marková (2000) takes up this issue in detail: she explains 
that cognition, from a social representational perspective, is based upon a dialogical 
understanding of the mind that is rooted within a Hegelian paradigm and the tradition of 
dialogism. Social representations theorists regard cognition as socio-cultural, as dynamic and, 
hence, as something that cannot be simply reduced to the level of the individual (Marková, 
2000). Moscovici clearly rejects individualistic versions of cognition. He argues against 
treating minds as “black boxes” (1984a, p. 15) and so rather looks at the content of thoughts 
and how these are historically and socially constituted and communicated. 
What is often overlooked by critics of this approach is that social representations 
theory clearly goes further in integrating culture and cognition than approaches of ‘shared’ or 
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‘distributed’ cognition that have been proposed in other areas of social psychology (cf. e.g. 
Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991). Different to these approaches that retain the separation of 
individual cognition and social interaction and only consider possible relations between them, 
social representations theory describes cognition as inherently and inevitably social and 
cultural. Consequently, social representations theory moves beyond the narrow definition of 
social cognition as individual cognition about others or influenced by others (Verheggen & 
Baerveldt, 2001). 
A possible reason for the charge of cognitive reductionism from the perspective of 
British discursive psychology could lie in their characterisation of cognition and action as 
oppositional. It appears here that cognition is equated with something that happens ‘inside 
individual minds’ without due attention to its social and ideological production. It is precisely 
such a dichotomy of mind and society that social representations theorists seek to challenge. 
Having challenged the depiction of social representations as mere mental templates, it 
needs to be made clear that many social representations theorists also object the interpretation 
of social representations as purely linguistic resources. As Moscovici (1985) has clearly 
stated “a discourse is not a representation, even if every representation is translated into a 
discourse. All that is image or concept does not entirely pass into language” (p. 92). While 
representations may manifest themselves in language, they do not necessarily have to. We 
may find social representations objectified in photographs, drawings, films, newspaper 
articles and the media generally &ndash; in any social practice (e.g. de Rosa, 1987; Jodelet, 
1991; Livingstone, 1998; Moscovici, 1961; Voelklein, 2004; Wagner, Kronberger & Seifert, 
2002). Howarth (2005) emphasises that “social representations are often only apparent in 
action” (p. 7, original emphasis). She gives examples from her research into black British 
pupils’ experiences in schools, which illustrate how the representation of ‘black youth’ is not 
so much expressed in actual dialogue but permeates the institutional cultures of schools, 
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informing the actions of teachers, particularly in their social practices of gaze in looking and 
not looking at black pupils (Howarth, 2004). A linguistic re-interpretation of social 
representations is less likely, we would assume, to capture the institutionalised and historical 
nature of these representations. By concentrating exclusively on ‘what talk does’, that is by 
taking a functional stance, British discursive psychology also risks of letting individualism 
‘in through the backdoor’ (Jovchelovitch, 1995). The concept of linguistic repertoires 
underemphasises the social origins of talk and text and overemphasises the content and 
immediate context of the conversation or document under study. Therefore, it does not only 
marginalise the wider relational and socio-cultural factors but also the actual social 
production and contestation of representation. This would in turn limit the critical potential of 
social representations theory. 
Social representations theory has also been charged with being acritical, in failing to 
seriously address issues of power and ideology (Ibañez, 1992; Jahoda, 1988). Parker (1987), 
for example, asserts that the way Moscovici treats the term ideology “blunts any critical 
cutting edge” (p. 458) as it is turned into “a harmless label for a system of beliefs” (p. 465). 
Moscovici’s (1984a) conceptualisation of ideology relates to his distinction between the 
consensual and the reified universe, which has been equally criticised. The consensual 
universe is the world of common sense. This is often seen as the space in which social 
representations are created, negotiated and transformed. The reified universe, by contrast, is 
inhabited by ‘experts’, often seen as scientists, who base their judgements of reality on 
experimentation, logic and rational choice. Moscovici (1984a) has described ideology as a 
mediator between these two universes: 
d) An acritical agenda? 
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We see more clearly the true nature of ideologies which is to facilitate the 
transition from the one world to the other, that is to cast consensual into 
reified categories and to subordinate the former to the latter. Hence they have 
no specific structures and can be perceived either as representations, or as 
sciences. (p.23) 
For the case of psychoanalysis, Moscovici (1984a) discusses how common sense can 
be turned into an ideology by being “appropriated by a party, a school of thought or an organ 
of state so that a product, created by the society as a whole, can be enforced in the name of 
science” (p. 58). This distinction between the consensual and reified universe has been 
fiercely debated by both critics (e.g. Jahoda, 1988; McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Potter & Billig, 
1992; Wells, 1987), as well as advocates of social representations theory (e.g. Flick, 1998; 
Foster, 2003; Howarth, 2005; Purkhardt, 1993). As echoed in a recent article by van Bavel 
and Gaskell (2004), McKinlay and Potter (1987) point out that there is a conceptual 
contradiction between, on the one hand, stating that all individuals use social representations 
to make sense of their worlds and on the other hand separating the world of science from the 
world of common sense. Given the fact that Moscovici (1984a) has acknowledged himself 
that science is equally subject to historical and social influence, he obviously must recognise 
that scientists like the rest of us rely on social representations in their daily interactions and 
activities. “It would, therefore, be a profound mistake to think of science as an 
unproblematically asocial realm of activities in which knowledge of ‘pure fact’ is generated; 
the scientist is as much trapped in his social world as is the layman” (McKinlay & Potter, 
1987, p. 479). 
Potter and Edwards (1999) claim that one negative implication of this dichotomy is 
that it has prevented social representations theorists from considering the impact of their own 
representations in the production of research itself. This last point at least does not appear to 
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be justified. Social representations theorists have been critically aware of the possible 
influences of their own representations and have discussed the impact of these and of their 
own identities on both the process and products of research (e.g. Farr, 1993; Howarth, 2002b; 
Voelklein, 2004). 
Another criticism of the relationship between the two universes is that it is often 
described as a one-way process of influence from the reified to the consensual. We can see 
this in research into the public understanding of science and biotechnology, for example, that 
explores how scientific or technical concepts become familiarised in common sense (e.g. 
Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Wagner et al., 2002). However, social representations theorists rarely 
investigate this relation in the opposite direction &ndash; that is how common sense 
influences the content and structure of science (Howarth et al., 2004). This clearly deserves 
attention as both Howarth (2005) and Purkhardt (1993) discuss. If all knowledge is socially 
constructed so is scientific knowledge. 
Yet, the formation of scientific and everyday concepts can be quite distinct due to the 
different conditions and structures of authority and power in both universes. One way of 
understanding how these two universes can co-exist within one and the same social world is 
in terms of different modes of thought. Bruner (1985) distinguishes between the narrative and 
the paradigmatic cognitive functioning or mode of thought that can each be performed by the 
same person at different times. Whereas the paradigmatic mode of thought is a systematic, 
abstract way of thinking that is based on logic, rigorous analyses, consistency and the 
establishment of facts, the narrative mode of thought is very concrete, particular and 
concentrated on human intentions and actions. Myths, well-formed stories, images and rich 
meanings play an important part in this narrative way of sensemaking. 
Treating the reified and the consensual has two co-existing and interacting forms of 
knowledge has also been proposed by Duveen and Lloyd (1990) and Flick (1998). As Foster 
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(2003) outlines, there is evidence in Moscovici’s work that he did not want to treat the two 
universes as strictly separate from one another. She comes to the conclusion that the 
distinction between the reified and the consensual is less central to the theory of social 
representations than has been generally assumed and supports this claim by pointing to his 
concept of cognitive polyphasia. 
A second way out of this overemphasised dichotomy has been proposed by Howarth (2005). 
She argues that the difference between the consensual and the reified universe points us to the 
process of reification that positions certain social representations as ‘expert knowledge’. 
Reification infuses social representations with ideological power by legitimising their 
dominant and dominating position over alternative representations. She argues that in order to 
fully develop the theory’s critical potential, social representations theorists need to analyse 
the ways in which different knowledge systems become reified in different situations. 
Developing Jovchelovitch’s (1997) assertion that some groups have more access to resources 
and thus a better chance of imposing their versions of reality and truth, Howarth (2005) 
invites us to study the role of power and conflict within the process of social re-presentation. 
By examining the politics that influence the hegemonic construction of social representations 
we can gain a better understanding of the interests that are at stake and the alternative 
representations that may be marginalised. This perspective also deconstructs the 
problematical unidirectional depiction of the relationship between common sense and 
science.
5
 
A critical approach to social representations obviously needs a clearer grasp of ideology. We 
need to analyse how representations may be infused with ideological power to justify the 
status quo and so maintain systems of inequality and exclusion (Howarth, 2004) as well as 
investigate how the public takes on, appropriates and contests existing ideologies in their 
representational work (Voelklein, 2003). An ideological perspective emphasises that in the 
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practice of social life, representations are never neutral but constantly permeated by power 
relations. Such a critical approach to social representations theory would provide us with the 
tools of evaluating representations in terms of their ability to legitimise and sustain unequal 
and oppressive power relations and marginalising practices. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the paper, we have tried to demonstrate that the complexity and dynamics 
between society and self-inherent in social representations theory are at the root of many of 
its criticisms and misunderstandings. We have elaborated this peculiar position of social 
representations theory with reference to four major areas of criticism: a) the claim of 
theoretical ambiguities; b) its portrayal as socially deterministic; c) its contrasting critique of 
cognitive reductionism as well as d) its charge of following an acritical agenda. Through a 
detailed evaluation of these criticisms, certain points could be revealed to be 
misinterpretations of social representations theory such as the lack of distinction from other 
conceptualisations, the notion of consensus or the nature of language and cognition. However, 
other points of critique were shown to be important and constructive ideas for theoretical 
refinement and extension, for example criticisms with regards to the problematic distinction 
between the consensual and the reified universe and the underdevelopment of the influence of 
argumentation, conflict, ideology and power on social representations. 
A starting point for investigating the void in treating ideology and power issues in 
social representations theory could be to examine whether there is some intrinsic 
characteristic of social representations theory that prevents researchers from approaching 
these issues. One property of the theory as it is currently applied that could be made 
responsible for this situation is its primary concentration on the content and structure of a 
social representation as opposed to its function and broader societal implications. Bauer and 
Gaskell (1999) assert that “social representations research has generally emphasised structure 
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over function” (p.173) and they “take it for granted that research on social representations 
will continue to foreground the comparative analysis of common sense, the contents of 
representations” (p.175). While we appreciate that an understanding of the nature and content 
of a representation is a pre-requisite for discussing its political or ideological consequences, it 
is this extra step in the analysis that is often omitted and that we regard as crucial for 
strengthening the theory’s critical power. In order to follow a critical agenda we need to 
move beyond a mere description of the status quo to a consideration of the historical roots, 
the immediate social function and the future implications of particular representations. That is, 
we need to examine what social representations do in social and political relations. 
Besides recognising areas for future development, theorists and researchers in this 
tradition may also want to consider how far they contribute themselves to the 
misunderstandings and criticisms voiced towards social representations theory. Employing 
concepts and terms that are predominantly associated with a highly individualised 
psychology such as ‘cognition’ or ‘representation’ without elaborating how they are to be 
understood within the context of their use may easily mislead the casual reader of writings on 
social representations. In addition to a lack of definition and elaboration, social 
representations theorists and researchers have also been criticised for incorporating these 
individual psychological terms uncritically and for hiding behind the cognitive label of 
unfamiliarity reduction that frees them from sufficiently engaging with the social and 
historical contexts (Guerin, 2001). Marková (2000) for example asserts that many social 
representations researchers give key social psychological concepts an individualistic and 
static instead of a socio-cultural and dynamic meaning. In this way, they do not do justice to 
the theory’s dialectical and dynamic features and foster stagnation and misconception rather 
than theoretical development. 
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Focussing on the dynamic and dialectical aspects of social representations theory is 
also desirable in terms of widening participation in this theoretical approach. If social 
representations theory comes to be perceived as static and descriptive it is less likely to 
appear suitable for explaining the heterogeneity, tension and change of modern social life 
Moscovici (1961) set out to explore. It is then no surprise that discourse theory becomes an 
attractive alternative. As Potter and Edwards (1999) make clear, what they consider an 
advantage of a discursive approach over social representations theory is its action orientation 
and its focus on the immediate dynamics of the communicative situation. While a discursive 
approach has its own limitations that we briefly alluded to, a stronger involvement with and 
reflection on the dynamic conceptual features of social representations and their 
methodological exploration as a socio-cultural practice could open further possibilities for 
theoretical development. 
As we have stressed throughout this paper, social representations theorists need to 
challenge both our critics and peers who marginalise the role of power, dialogue and 
resistance in the development and circulation of representations. We would suggest that 
empirical work in the field should build up a more explicitly critical agenda that promotes a 
social psychology of conflict, resistance and social participation in our understanding of the 
interconnections between social structures and subjectivities, culture and cognition, the social 
and the psychological. It is in this spirit of theoretical advancement and critical engagement 
in social representations theorising and research that this review should be understood. 
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Endnotes 
1
 Studies into the development of social knowledge about previously unknown or threatening social 
objects demonstrate the representational processes involved in taming the unknown. These 
include extensive research into representations of science and new technologies (e.g. Bauer & 
Gaskell, 1999; Wagner et al., 2002), of HIV-AIDS (e.g. Campbell, 2003; Joffe 1996) and of 
mental illness (Jodelet, 1991;Schmitz, Filippone, & Edelman, 2003). 
1
 The Oxford Dictionary (1995) defines a representation primarily as ‘an image, likeness, or 
reproduction of a thing e.g. a painting or drawing’, thus clearly referring to the mirroring 
function of representation. 
1
 Conversely, an emphasis on diversity and fragmentation does not mean that there cannot be 
widely shared or hegemonic representations within contemporary societies (Howarth, 2005; 
Moscovici, 1988). Representations of gender, for example, are remarkably resistant to 
historical change (Voelklein, 2003) and contextual factors (Lloyd & Duveen, 1992). 
1
 However, as we discuss below, with Moscovici’s use of the notion of ideology, Jahoda’s (1988) 
criticism of an unnecessary overlap of certain categories seems to be at least partly justified. 
1
 Such an approach resonates with recent work within the sociology of scientific knowledge (e.g. 
Latour, 1991) that is concerned with identifying the different actors that take part in the 
legitimisation of certain ideas as science. 
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1 Studies into the development of social knowledge about previously unknown or 
threatening social objects demonstrate the representational processes involved in 
taming the unknown. These include extensive research into representations of 
science and new technologies (e.g. Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Wagner et al., 2002), of 
HIV-AIDS (e.g. Campbell, 2003; Joffe 1996) and of mental illness (Jodelet, 
1991;Schmitz, Filippone, & Edelman, 2003). 
2 The Oxford Dictionary (1995) defines a representation primarily as ‘an image, 
likeness, or reproduction of a thing e.g. a painting or drawing’, thus clearly 
referring to the mirroring function of representation.  
3 Conversely, an emphasis on diversity and fragmentation does not mean that there 
cannot be widely shared or hegemonic representations within contemporary 
societies (Howarth, 2005; Moscovici, 1988). Representations of gender, for 
example, are remarkably resistant to historical change (Voelklein, 2003) and 
contextual factors (Lloyd & Duveen, 1992). 
4 However, as we discuss below, with Moscovici’s use of the notion of ideology, Jahoda’s 
(1988) criticism of an unnecessary overlap of certain categories seems to be at 
least partly justified. 
5 Such an approach resonates with recent work within the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (e.g. Latour, 1991) that is concerned with identifying the different 
actors that take part in the legitimisation of certain ideas as science. 
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